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"And if you have not been faithful in the use of that which is
another's, who will give you that which is your own?"
Luke 16:12 (New American Standard Bible)
INTRODUCTION
If one accepts the statistics offered by the federal government
about its response to perceived misconduct leading to the financial
crisis in 2008, the ready conclusion seems to be that most
perpetrators have been held accountable. For example, the
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which was created in
2009 to pursue cases related to the crisis, routinely takes credit for
almost any prosecution involving financial misconduct, touting
that `[o]ver the past three fiscal years, the Justice Department
. Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I appreciate the
comments and suggestions of my colleagues on the Wayne State University Law School
faculty who allowed me to inflict a draft on them, for the gracious comments provided
by Professor Brandon Garrett (Virginia) and Dr. Marc Engelhart (Max-Planck-Institut
fMr auslandisches und internationales Strafrecht), and the research assistance of
Pamela Wall (Wayne State University Law School Class of 2015).
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has filed nearly 10,000 financial fraud cases against nearly 15,000
defendants including more than 2,900 mortgage fraud
defendants."' The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
a tally of the civil enforcement actions it has.brought for violations
arising from the financial crisis, claiming that 175 companies and
individuals have been charged, including 70 senior corporate
officers, resulting in more than $1.87 billion of penalties agreed to
or ordered.2 Interestingly, the Department of Justice was also
caught inflating its claims about the number of prosecutions
brought in 2012 related to its "Distressed Homeowner Initiative,"
which it claimed was "inadvertentU."3 In an addendum to its press
release regarding a prosecution, the Department rescinded its
previous figure and significantly decreased the reported number of
defendants charged.4
Yet, there is clearly a disconnect between what the
government claims has been a successful enforcement effort,
targeting crimes and civil violations that arose during the run-up
to the financial crisis, and the public's perception that the
Department of Justice and SEC have failed to hold senior
management accountable for the economic calamities inflicted, In
2013, PBS produced an investigatory documentary called "The
Untouchables"-so entitled for Wall Street's apparent immunity
from the long arm of the law-which featured an interview with
then-Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, who led the
Criminal Division at the Department of Justice from 2009 until
2013, about the apparent lack of prosecutions from the financial
crisis:
LANNY BREUER: Well, first of all, I think that the financial
crisis, Martin, is multi-faceted. And what we've had is a
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Former UBS Executives Sentenced to
Serve Time in Prison for Frauds Involving Contracts Related to the Investment of
Municipal Bond Proceeds (July 24, 2013), available at
http://www.stopfraud.govisolopalstopfraud/2013/13-at-839.htmi.
2 SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led to or Arose from the
Financial Crisis, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COWM'N, http://www.sec.govispotlightlenf-actions-
fe.shtml (last updated Sept. 11, 2014).
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force Members Reveal Results of Distressed Homeowner Initiative (revised Aug. 9,
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/October/12-ag-1216.html.
' Id.
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multi-pronged, multi-faceted response. And it's simply a
fiction to say that where crimes were committed, we didn't
pursue the cases. And that's why, where crimes were
committed, you have more people in jail today for securities
fraud, bank fraud and the like than ever before.
MARTIN SMITH: But no Wall Street executives.
LANNY BREUER: No Wall Street executives. 5
Former Senator Ted Kaufman lays the blame for the lack of
prosecutions of financial executives squarely at the door of the
Department of Justice, stating "that those most responsible for
indicting and prosecuting Wall Street executives seem to believe
that, just as there are banks that are too big to fail, there are
people who are too big to jail."6 Jeff Connaughton, who served as
chief of staff for Senator Kaufman, goes a step further and asserts
that "[flrom the beginning, Ted and I feared that the Obama
administration leadership might tend to let Wall Street off the
hook so as not to impede the economic recovery."7
Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, a federal prosecutor and
defense lawyer prior to his appointment to the bench, stated that
in his view "the Department of Justice has never taken the
position that all the top executives involved in the events leading
up to the financial crisis were innocent; rather, it has offered one
or another excuse for not criminally prosecuting them-excuses
that, on inspection, appear unconvincing."8 A former SEC
attorney, in a speech at his retirement party in March 2014,
lamented that the agency's "best and brightest" left because they
saw that it "polices the broken windows on the street level and
rarely goes to the penthouse floors" so that "[tiough enforcement-
' PBS Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbblpages/frontlinelbusiness-economy-financial-
crisis/untouchables/transcript-371 (providing a transcript of the broadcast).
a Ted Kaufman, Why DOJ Deemed Bank Execs Too Big To Jail, FORBES (July 29,
2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.comilsites/tedkaufman/2013/07/29/why-doj-deemed-
bank-execs-too-big-to-jaill.
7 JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STRRE.T ALWAYS WINS 65 (2012).
8 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV, BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http:lwww.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/,
45
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
risky enforcement-is subject to extensive negotiation and
weakening."9
One important reason proffered for the lack of prosecutions of
financial executives in the United States has been the difficulty of
proving the violation of criminal laws typically used to prosecute
corporate misconduct, such as mail and wire fraud, securities
fraud and filing false statements with the government. These
offenses require establishing a defendant's specific intent to
commit the crime,' 0 a seemingly insurmountable standard of proof
for cases related to the financial crisis. In "The Untouchables"
documentary, an associate deputy director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation said that prosecutions for the packaging of toxic
mortgages were not pursued because "[w]e were not able to show
criminal intent sufficiently enough to obtain what we believe-to
obtain a conviction of a criminal[.]"" Preet Bharara, the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York who was
pictured on the cover of Time magazine behind the headline "This
Man Is Busting Wall Street,"1 2 had this to say about the difficulty
in pursing cases for allegedly false statements made to the
government:
Maybe there's a lot of smoke-now comes the proof. This guy's
going to testify, 'My accountant's a smart guy-I just relied on
my accountant.' The accountant's going to say, 'I just relied on
what he gave me,' and everyone has plausible deniability.
That's a simple example of a way in which people can get
Robert Schmidt, SEC Goldman Lawyer Says Agency Too Timid on Wall Street
Misdeeds, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2014), http:llwww.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-08/sec-
goldman-lawyer-says-agency-too-timid-on-wall-street-misdeeds.html; see also James
Kidney, Retirement Remarks (Mar. 27, 2014) (transcript on file with author), available
at https://www.documenteloud.org/documents/1105575-s-e-c-officials-retiremenspeech.
html.
1o See United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012) ("[The mail fraud
and wire fraud statutes have as an element the specific intent to deprive one of
something of value through a misrepresentation or other similar dishonest method,
which indeed would cause him harm."); United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 700 (5th
Cir. 2012) ("Violation of the wire-fraud statute requires the specific intent to defraud..
PBS Frontline: The Untouchables, supra note 5.
n This Man Is Busting Wall St.: Prosecutor Preet Bharara Collars the Masters of
the Meltdown, TIME, Feb. 13, 2012, at cover, available at
http:/lcontent.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20120213,00.html.
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away with even criminal activity when they're making false
certifications to the government.' 3
If a primary reason for the lack of prosecutions of executives
is the high threshold for proving intent, then one potential
response-which has not been expressed by the Department of
Justice to this point-may be to reduce the requisite intent
element, so that it is easier to pursue a case and establish a
violation when there are substantial losses from corporate
decisions. Reducing the threshold for liability to one of
recklessness-or even negligence-would facilitate the government's
use of the criminal law to police corporate management. Defining
a new crime that can be established by a lower level of intent
could lead to more prosecutions of corporate management whose
decisions can have a wide economic impact. It would be a
deterrent to those executives contemplating a course of action
involving outsized risks that might otherwise be pursued when
there is no realistic threat of individual criminal liability.
Whether a lower burden of proof, designed to increase the
number of prosecutions of corporate executives, is a good thing
represents a different issue entirely. A range of commentators
have bemoaned the expansion of the federal criminal law, the
usual venue for pursuing cases involving large-scale corporate
misconduct, as part of a broader critique known as
"overcriminalization."1 4 Usually described in ominous terms, the
notion is that there are too many prosecutions and there is too
much use of criminal sanctions in American society when civil or
administrative remedies can achieve the same results. Particular
targets of this critique are Congress and the Department of
Justice, often assailed as running roughshod over the states in a
stampede to pursue conduct traditionally reserved to local
1 George Packer, A Dirty Business, NEW YORKER, June 27, 2011,
http:./www.newyorker.com/magazinc/2011/06127/a-dirty-business.
14 See, e.g., Bryan H. Druzin & Jessica Li, The Criminalization of Lying: Under
What Circumstances, If Any, Should Lies Be Made Criminal?, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 529, 553 (2011) ("There is broad agreement in the legal community that
the justice system is already severely overcrininalized."). See generally Sanford H.
Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 157
(1967) (discussing "problems of overcriminalization").
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prosecutors.15 Aspects of this critique are certainly open to
question, and it has been pointed out that "[mjany of the statutes
that have historically generated controversy because of their
triviality (for example, the prohibition on using the likeness of
Smokey Bear) or federalism concerns (such as the federal
carjacking statute) are rarely, if ever, used."16 Given the
persistent complaints about the lack of prosecutions from the
financial crisis, there is an interesting question of whether the
overcriminalization concerns may need to give way to allow one
more federal statute that can be used against corporate executives
involved in conduct that results in significant harms to their
company and the broader economy.' 7
There are examples outside the United States that can guide
an effort to add to the federal arsenal to pursue cases in the future
for the type of conduct that resulted in so much economic
disruption in 2008. One approach adopted in the United Kingdom
makes it a crime for executives to engage in reckless conduct that
causes a bank to fail. The initial proposal for the legislation drew
the support of Prime Minister David Cameron for "criminal
penalties against bankers who behave irresponsibly." 18 In
15 See Peter J. Henning, Making Sure "The Buck Stops Here'" Barring Executives
for Corporate Violations, 2012 U. CHI, LEGAL F. 91, 107-08 ("The critique that there is
overcriminalization appears to be used more as a placeholder to describe how the
criminal law has expanded so that there are too many defendants being prosecuted and
incarcerated, sometimes for significant periods of time.").
" Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of
Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 5-6 (2012).
" Even if one accepts the premise that the law should be changed to permit more
prosecutions of executives for their business decisions, there is the additional concern
about whether the criminal law is the best way to police corporate conduct. At least
when the company is the target of the prosecution, Professors Fischel and Sykes have
concluded that while "there are cases where government fines and penalties make
sense, the civil liability system is better suited to calculate appropriate fines and
penalties for organizational defendants." Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate
Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321 (1996). The threat of imprisonment is a powerful
tool to be used for ordinary business conduct, and it may be that civil liability rather
than prison is the best way to deal with corporate decisions, especially those made in
diffuse organization in which a number of different individuals have input. For the
purposes of this Essay, I will accept that there is a need for a new law, and that the
criminal sanction can be applied appropriately to business decisions by corporate
executives while acknowledging that there are good arguments against even pursuing
new legislation.
'R Matt Chorley & Ruth Sutherland, 'We WILL Jail Reckless Bankers: Cameron
Vows to Criminalise Irresponsible Behaviour and Ban Bonuses at Bailed Out Banks,
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Germany, Christian Wulff said in 2009 when he was premier of
Lower-Saxony that "'b]lowing a bank's money contrary to
managers' duties is a criminal offence"' 9 in reference to a
provision of the German criminal code that makes it a crime for
corporate management to engage in conduct that is an abuse of
trust. That provision focuses on the failure to safeguard a
company's property and could be a means to prosecute executives
for taking excessive risks that result in substantial economic
harm.
Federal law in the United States is not completely bereft of
tools that could be adapted to the corporate setting so as to permit
prosecutions for risky management decisions like those identified
as significant contributors to the financial crisis. For example, in
the environmental and food and drug safety fields, the
"responsible corporate officer" doctrine permits a prosecution
without regard to the defendant's knowledge or intent for the
underlying violation, relying instead on the person's supervisory
role as the basis for imposing criminal liability.2 0 At one time,
there was a provision of federal law that might have been useful
to address misconduct that involved dishonesty by senior
management. The federal "right of honest services" statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1346, provided that one type of fraud subject to
prosecution involved "a scheme or artifice to deprive another of
the intangible right of honest services." 21 This was interpreted by
some lower courts to prohibit conflicts of interest and self-dealing
that resulted in illicit gains to the defendant, even if there was no
direct harm to the party owed the honest services, But the
Supreme Court eliminated that analysis in 2010 in Skilling v.
United States when it held that § 1346 was limited to conduct in
DAILY MAIL (June 19, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/nows/article.
234451 I/David-Cameron-We-WILL-jail-reckless-bankers.html.
H, Volker Krey, Financial Crisis and German Criminal Law: Managers'
Responsibility for Highly-Speculative Trading in Obscure Asset-Backed Securities
Based on American Subprime Mortgages, II GERMAN L.J_ 319, 320 (2010).
" The Supreme Court recognized this doctrine in United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658, 676 (1975), where it permitted "conviction of responsible corporate officials who, in
light of this standard of care, have the power to prevent or correct violations."
s' 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
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which the defendant receives a bribe or kickbacks, the type of
financial misconduct rarely seen in the executive suite.22
A concerted effort to subject corporate executives to the
threat of criminal prosecution for their mismanagement of a
company would require a new law that can effectively reach
conduct without requiring proof of an intent to defraud or to
engage in purposeful misconduct-the stumbling blocks the
Department of Justice identified for not prosecuting cases from
the financial crisis. In this Essay, I will look at possible
approaches to adopting a statute that would permit federal
prosecutors to pursue cases against corporate executives for their
managerial decisions-decisions that result in significant economic
harms, like those seen in the 2008 financial crisis. Part I will
review different federal laws that already target managers under
the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine-laws that do not
require proof of specific intent and in some instances hold a
defendant strictly liable-and discuss the problems that arise when
adapting that approach to the broader corporate setting. Parts II
and III will examine the strengths and weaknesses of German and
British statutes that target corporate and bank management and
consider how they provide guidance for possibly enacting a new
crime in the United States. The Essay concludes by considering
whether new legislation is needed, or whether the conduct that led
to the financial crisis was sui generis and does not support a call
for enacting a new crime.
I. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
The challenge of establishing a defendant's intent is a
familiar one in the criminal law. Courts recognize that proving
what is in an individual's mind does not depend solely on what the
person says he or she was thinking at the time and circumstantial
evidence can suffice for a jury to infer the requisite intent even if
the defendant denies involvement in the offense. For example, in
United States v. Lamarre,23 a bank fraud prosecution, the Seventh
Circuit said that "[slpecific intent may be established by
circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from the scheme
22 Skilling v United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411-12 (2010).
- 248 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001).
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itself," so that "actions such as knowingly depositing an NSF or
forged check, knowingly writing checks on an inadequate account
balance, and providing false information on loan documents
constitute circumstantial evidence of specific intent to defraud." 24
When knowledge is an element of the offense, the government can
request what is commonly known as the "ostrich instruction,"
which permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of a
defendant's conscious avoidance of the very information that
would have shown criminal conduct, thus proving that the person
acted knowingly by being deliberately ignorant 2 5
In prosecutions of corporate misconduct, however, even those
more forgiving standards have often proved to be too great an
impediment to establishing criminal intent for senior
management. Many corporate officials are far removed from the
day-to-day company decisions that can turn out to be fraudulent,
so it is difficult to find evidence to establish their knowledge in the
circumstantial evidence. For example, the former Chairman and
CEO of Lehman Brothers denied any awareness of an accounting
gimmick that ultimately involved transactions running into the
billions of dollars.2 6 Those borrowings made the firm appear to
investors to be much stronger in the months before its bankruptcy
in September 2008 than it actually was. This claim of ignorance
appears to have succeeded, because neither the Department of
21 Id. at 649.
25 See United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Recognizing
that Boone's defense was in part to deny his knowledge of the scheme, the district court
provided the ostrich instruction to the jury, instructing them that: 'When the word
"knowingly" is used in these instructions, it means that the defendant realized what he
was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct and did nut act through
ignorance, mistake or accident. Knowledge may be proved by the defendant's conduct
and by all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. You may infer knowledge
from a combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person
had a strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone had
withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you
may conclude that he acted knowingly, as I have used that word. You may not conclude
that the defendant had knowledge if he was merely negligent in not discovering the
truth.").
26 See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy
Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 70 (2010)
(statement of Richard S. Fuld Jr., Former Chairman and CEO, Lehman Bros.) ("Let me
start by saying that I have absolutely no recollection whatsoever of hearing anything
about or seeing documents related to Repo 105 transactions while I was the CEO of
Lehman.").
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Justice nor the SEC pursued a case against any of its executives. 2 7
In another case, the SEC accused the owner of a hedge fund,
Steven A. Cohen, of failing to supervise portfolio managers and
analysts at the firm who engaged in insider trading 28 Mr. Cohen
denied reviewing an e-mail he received that raised questions
about the source of the information the firm used for its trades,
claiming he only had time to look at a few of the many
communications received every day.29 Unlike defendants who
brandish weapons or traffic narcotics and stolen property, whose
denials of culpability are inherently suspect, a corporate manager
can plausibly claim to have been ignorant of the details of a
transaction, to not understand the full ramifications of what
happened, or to have believed that there was nothing improper
about a decision because other advisers-both inside and outside
the company-never questioned its propriety. Ignorance of the law
may not be an excuse for a crime, but it can be an effective defense
when the violation requires proof of knowledge.
One criminal statute directed squarely at corporate
executives is the financial certification provision of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, adopted by Congress in response to the accounting
frauds that felled companies like Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia
Communications. The statute imposes significant criminal
penalties on the chief executive officer and chief financial officer
who knowingly and willfully certify the financial statements,
which do not comport with the accounting rules, of a company
whose shares are publicly traded, with a lower penalty for such a
V See Henning, supra note 15, at 118 ("A bankruptcy examiner concluded that the
Repo 105 trades were potentially misleading to investors, but Richard S. Fuld Jr, the
firm's former CEO, proclaimed his ignorance of the entire set of financial machinations,
asserting that he relied on others to deal with such things. Neither the DOJ nor the
SEC has filed charges against any former Lehman officers for the Repo 105
transactions-or anything else for that matter-and the firm's bankruptcy means the
government will not pursue an action against it because to do so would be fruitless.").
2 Cohen, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3634, 2013 WL 3776681 (July 19,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationiadmin/2013/ia-3634.pdf.
* James Sterngold & Jenny Strasburg, SAC: Cohen Didn't Read Key Email-White
Paper for Employees by Hedge-Fund Firm's Lawyers Says Chief Executliue Did Nothing
Wrong, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2013, at C1 ("SAC Capital Advisors LP fired back at the
U.S. government, telling employees Monday that the evidence shows Steven A. Cohen
'did not even read' the email at the heart of allegations he failed to take proper steps to
prevent insider trading at his hedge-fund firm.").
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certification which is done knowingly but not willfullya 0 But like
other types of offenses, the certification provision requires proof of
at least knowledge, evidence that appears to have been in short
supply in cases arising from the financial crisis. Moreover, the
only conduct reached involves certification of financial statements
and not broader activities that put a company at risk, which may
be properly reported.3 '
A. Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
To get around the difficulties in proving a manager's
knowledge or intent for the specific actions that violated the law,
limited areas of federal law allow a conviction based largely on the
person's official position and direct supervisory responsibility for
the conduct, regardless of any actual involvement in the crime.
Applying the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine extends the
criminal law to those in a position of authority in an organization
by requiring only proof of negligence or even imposing strict
liability when there is a violation.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine is a way to hold
managers liable for conduct by those under their direct
supervision by eliminating the traditional requirement for
criminal responsibility that depends on proving the defendant
engaged in the prohibited conduct-or caused the particular harm-
with the requisite intent. Instead, this approach imposes vicarious
liability on an officer or director based on the person's supervisory
position within the company and their negligent failure to prevent
a violation.3 2 Under the doctrine, a senior corporate official can be
punished for a lower-level employee's criminal activity, even
3 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2012). The penalty for a knowing violation is a maximum
fine of $1 million and up to 10 years in prison, while a knowing and willful violation
can result in a $5 million fine and up to 20 years in prison. Id.
Along the same lines, the SEC can seek to claw back up to a year's worth of
bonuses and other compensation awarded the chief executive officer and chief financial
officer if the company issued a restatement of its financial statements. 15 U.S.C. §
7243(a) (2012). Like § 1350, this provision is limited to restatements and only covers
two senior executives and not others in management who may be responsible for
misconduct by the organization.
- "The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent
it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it
might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities." Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952).
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though the officer did not participate in, and may have been
unaware of, the actual conduct.33 Liability is based on the person's
responsibility within the organization and authority to prevent or
correct a violation, so that the crime occurs when the person's
failure to act results in a violation taking place. The intent
standard can be negligence, which requires proof that the
corporate official did not act reasonably to prevent the violation, or
in some instances strict liability, which requires proof of only a
violation to hold corporate officers liable. 34 This approach
eliminates defenses typically seen in corporate crime cases, such
as good faith or a lack of knowledge, so long as it can be shown
that the official failed to prevent misconduct by others for whom
the person is responsible. This is quite unlike the traditional
approach to aiding and abetting a crime that depends on showing
intent to commit the underlying offense.35 The responsible
corporate officer doctrine substitutes supervisorial authority and
the consequent failure to prevent a violation as sufficient to
support a criminal conviction.
The doctrine has been upheld twice by the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Dotterweich36 and United States v. Park.37 In
Dotterweich, the Court affirmed the misdemeanor conviction of the
president of a company for a misbranding offense under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, even though the government was not
1 See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The
gravamen of liability as a responsible corporate officer is not one's corporate title or
lack thereof; rather, the pertinent question is whether the defendant bore such a
relationship to the corporation that it is appropriate to hold him criminally liable for
failing to prevent the charged violations....").
3 See Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1265 (2006) ("[Jiust as negligent crimes impose a duty
to take care that one's actions do not unintentionally cause a violation of the law,
where the responsible corporate officer doctrine applies, a negligent crime prosecuted
under the responsible corporate officer doctrine recognizes a duty to take care that
one's failure to act does not unintentionally cause a violation of the law."),
* See United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997) ("To be
convicted [as a principal of aiding and abetting [the commission of a crime], the jury
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 'knowingly and intentionally
aided and abetted the principals in each essential element of the crime."') (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
36 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
37 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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required to prove his actual knowledge of the misconduct.3 8 The
Court held that the statute "dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some
wrongdoing."39 Finding that Congress intended to impose strict
liability for any violation, the Court concluded that it was
permissible to hold a corporate executive liable for the violation
because
[b]alancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to
place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of
informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed
for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit
commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the innocent
public who are wholly helpless. 40
The Court stated that in the interest of protecting the public
from adulterated drugs, the statute "puts the burden of acting at
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger." 4 1 This analysis eliminates
a claim that the defendant did not personally cause the violation,
or acted in an "otherwise innocent" way. Those might be worthy
considerations at sentencing, but they do not affect the application
of the criminal law to the conduct in Dotterweich.
In Park, the Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld
the conviction of the president of a supermarket chain for the
presence of unsanitary conditions at two of the company's storage
warehouses in violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.42
The defendant challenged the trial court's jury instruction, which
permitted conviction "even if [the defendant] did not consciously
do wrong," provided he "had a position of authority and
responsibility in the situation out of which [the] charges arose,"43
The Court held that the statute "imposes not only a positive duty
to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and
" Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284 ("Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute
which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally
wanting.").
3 Id. at 281.
40 Td. at 285.
41 Id, at 280-81 (emphasis added).
42 Park, 421 U.S. at 666-67.
43 Id. at 665 n.9 (citation omitted).
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primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that
violations will not occur.""
The responsible corporate officer doctrine was used recently
in a case involving misbranded drugs. Three senior executives at
Purdue Frederick Co. pleaded guilty to misdemeanor violations for
failing to prevent the company from marketing misbranded
OxyContin, a powerful pain killing medication.45 The three
executives admitted that they had "responsibility and authority
either to prevent in the first instance or to promptly correct the
misrepresentations . . . Purdue employees made regarding [the
addictive nature of prescription drugs]."46 The charges were based
solely on their positions in the corporation, and they were "not
charged with personal knowledge of the misbranding or with any
personal intent to defraud." 47 The district court noted that "[t]he
government is also convinced that the nature of the convictions of
the individual defendants-based on strict liability for
misbranding-will send a strong deterrent message to the
pharmaceutical industry." 48 Substantial fines were imposed,4 9
along with an effort by the Department of Health and Human
Services to exclude them from future involvement in federal
healthcare programs based on the guilty pleas.5 0 This remedy
would effectively end their careers in the pharmaceutical
industry.5 ' Thus, the responsible corporate officer doctrine can
4 Id. at 672.
45 Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The executives were
the former president and CEO, the executive vice president and chief legal officer, and
the former chief scientific officer. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F.
Supp. 2d 569, 570 n.2 (W.D. Va. 2007). The company is now named Purdue Pharma
L.P.
46 Friedman, 686 F.3d at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 571-
48 Id. at 576. The district judge noted that it was a close question whether to
sentence the defendants to a term of incarceration, but stated, "I find that in the
absence of government proof of knowledge by the individual defendants of the
wrongdoing, prison sentences are not appropriate." Id.
49 The individuals "agreed to pay a total of $34.5 million to the Virginia Medicaid
Fraud Unit's Program Income Fund." Id. at 573.
- See Friedman, 686 F.3d at 816 ("Based upon their convictions, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services later excluded the individuals from participation in
Federal health care programs for 12 years, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b).").
* Id. at 823-24, 828 (upholding authority of HHS to exclude the defendants from
federal healthcare programs but reversing a twelve-year ban as unsupported by the
record).
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have a substantial impact on an executive, even if there is no
prison term imposed, because of the potential collateral
consequences of a conviction.s2
Application of the responsible corporate officer doctrine has
been extended to other public welfare provisions, such as those
regulating meat branding and inspections.53 In United States v.
Wise,54 an antitrust case, the Supreme Court rejected an
executive's argument that the law only applied to corporations
and not individuals, and relying on Dotterweich concluded that the
Sherman Act should be read "to apply to all officers who have a
responsible share in the proscribed transaction."55
Another area in which the doctrine is used with some
regularity involves violations of the Clean Water Act and Clean
Air Act, both of which specifically provide that the definition of a
"person" includes "any responsible corporate officer."56 In United
States v. Iverson,57 the Ninth Circuit explained that an executive
came within the Clean Water Act when "the person has authority
to exercise control over the corporation's activity that is causing
the discharges. There is no requirement that the officer in fact
exercise such authority or that the corporation expressly vest a
duty in the officer to oversee the activity."58
In United States v. Hanousek,5 9 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
conviction of a railroad supervisor for a violation of the Clean
Water Act as a "responsible corporate officer" in connection with a
ruptured pipeline that caused thousands of gallons of oil to flow
into a river.60 The circuit court stated, "We conclude from the
plain language of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A) that Congress intended
5 See Joshua ). Greenberg & Ellen C. Brotman, Strict Vicarious Criminal
Liability for Corporations and Corporate Executives: Stretching the Boundaries of
Criminalization, 51 AM. CRIM. L. ReV. 79, 92 (2014) ("For the three executives who pled
guilty in the Purdue Frederick case, however, the penalties were severe-seemingly
career-ending-and caused great damage to their reputations.").
" See, e.g., United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 50 (8th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 235 (10th Cir. 1986).
* 370 U.S. 405 (1962),
' Id. at 409.
* 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (2012).
r 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998).
5 Id. at 1025.
5 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999).
0 Id. at 1118-20.
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that a person who acts with ordinary negligence in violating 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) may be subject to criminal penalties." 1 The
Fourth Circuit looked beyond formal titles in upholding the
conviction of an officer responsible for a company's finances who
refused to authorize an upgrade to a wastewater treatment
system that had been clogged. In United States v. Ming Hong,62
the circuit court stated, "The gravamen of liability as a responsible
corporate officer is not one's corporate title or lack thereof; [but]
rather, . . . whether the defendant bore such a relationship to the
corporation that it is appropriate to hold him criminally liable for
failing to prevent the charged violations of the CWA."63 The
punishment imposed on the defendant included a three-year term
of imprisonment, 64 a substantial penalty for a violation grounded
on the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
There are limits to the application of the responsible
corporate officer doctrine, the most important being when a
statute requires proof of intent for the offense to occur. Liability
cannot be based simply on the defendant's position in the
company, at least so long as the violation required proof of
knowledge and not just negligence or that it was a strict liability
offense. In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.,65
the First Circuit reversed the conviction of a company's president
and owner for violating a provision of Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act that required proof of knowledge.66 The district court
had instructed the jury that the defendant's role as the
61Id. at 1121.
6 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001).
0 Id. at 531. The Fourth Circuit described the following evidence as sufficient to
establish the defendant acted as a responsible corporate officer at the company:
[A]lthough Hong went to great lengths to avoid being formally associated
with Avion, in fact he substantially controlled corporate operations,
Furthermore, Hong was involved in the purchase of the filtration system and
was aware, in advance, that the filtration media would quickly be depleted if
used as Hong intended. And, the evidence supported a finding that Hong was
in control of Avion's finances and refused to authorize payment for additional
filtration media. Finally, Hong was regularly present at the Avion site, and
discharges occurred openly while Hong was present. Accordingly, we affirm
Hong's convictions.
Id. at 532.
" Id. at 532.
0 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
6o Id. at 51.
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responsible corporate officer could be sufficient to establish his
liability; the circuit found the instruction improper because "[i]n a
crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of
official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an
adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of
knowledge."6 7
The responsible corporate officer doctrine has not been
confined to just criminal cases. In People v. Roscoe,6 8 the
California Court of Appeal held that individual corporate officers
could be jointly and severally liable for civil penalties imposed for
violations of a state environmental statute because "the
responsible corporate officer doctrine applies to . .. the tank laws,
and thus subjects to liability . . . a corporate officer who has 'a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the
statute outlaws."'6 9 Other states have similarly applied the
doctrine under their environmental laws to hold corporate
employees responsible for civil penalties and remedial orders for
violations by the company. 70
B. Should Respoasible Corporate Officer Liability Be Applied
More Broadly?
The rationale for applying the responsible corporate officer
doctrine is to create a means to prevent companies from
undertaking hazardous activities that can threaten public safety
and welfare. In Park, the Supreme Court addressed the balance
between imposing criminal liability on a corporate officer
uninvolved in the actual violation and the need to protect the
public:
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on
responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding,
and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the
public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume
7 Id. at 55.
6 169 Cal. App. 4th 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
6 Id. at 832 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943)).
70 See, e.g., In re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 488-91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Ind.
Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 558 (Ind. 2001); Wash. Dep't of
Ecology v. Lundgren, 971 P.2d 948, 951-53 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Rollfink, 475
N.W.2d 575, 576 (Wis. 1991).
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positions of authority in business enterprises whose services
and products affect the health and well-being of the public
that supports them.71
Similarly, in Dotterweich, the Court made clear its view that
Congress sought to protect interests of the public over the
interests of executives because the executives are privy to
information that the public lacks.72 Liability is premised on the
authority of the official within the organization to prevent a
violation, or to promptly remedy one if it occurs, so that the threat
to the public from the company's activity is minimized.7 3
The responsible corporate officer doctrine operates in
situations in which the potential impact of a violation by the
company is clear and the threat to public health and safety is of
such significance that requiring management to carefully monitor
its activities-under the specter of individual criminal prosecution-
is a necessary complement to the usual measures taken to ensure
compliance with the law. Adulterated drugs, unsanitary food
conditions, and improper discharge of hazardous materials
present a potentially significant threat to the general public, and
can be activities so fraught with danger that imposing an
additional layer of liability for corporate officials is appropriate.
Requiring proof of negligence, or even imposing strict liability,
may be acceptable when the costs of a violation are significant, as
illustrated by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2011-although even in
that type of case, imposing criminal liability may be little more
than a nod to public outrage, rather than an effort to prevent
future misconduct.74
Extending the doctrine to the type of conduct that led to the
financial crisis is open to question, however. Unlike an oil spill or
sale of misbranded addictive pain medication, some of the
71 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
72 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
73 See Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74 ("[T]he Government establishes a prima facie case
when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that
the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of, and that he failed to do so.").
14 But see Greenberg & Brotman, supra note 52, at 94 ("For nine reasons, many of
which mirror the reasons why strict vicarious criminal liability for corporations should
be rejected, the Park doctrine is unfair, is bad policy, and should be abolished.").
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"products" that were identified as contributors to the financial
crisis, like credit default swaps and mortgage-backed securities,
are part of a wide range of legitimate and commonplace corporate
transactions. The problems occurred, at least in part, because of
excessive risks taken by banks, insurance companies, and
brokerages when creating and trading more exotic types of
securities that transformed the housing market collapse into a
global economic crisis. But that was not the only cause of the
economic problems that afflicted banks: the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission (FCIC) noted that there were "widespread
failures in financial regulation"; "dramatic breakdowns of
corporate governance"; "excessive borrowing" and risk-taking by
households and Wall Street; policy makers who were "ill prepared
for the crisis"; and systemic breaches in "accountability and
ethics" at all levels.7 5
There is no doubt that the financial crisis caused significant
harm to the stability of the global banking system in myriad ways,
but it was not traceable to any single event or investment vehicle.
As pointed out by a dissenting report from the FCIC, "[niot
everything that went wrong during the financial crisis caused the
crisis, and while some causes were essential, others had only a
minor impact."7 6 Although one could analogize certain particularly
risky derivatives to hazardous waste-described by Warren Buffett
as "financial weapons of mass destruction" five years before the
financial crisis, 77-there is not a very good correlation between the
types of violations seen in responsible corporate officer cases and
the countless problems that lead up to the financial crisis, none of
which can be easily identified as a direct cause or even a
predominant contributor.
Constitutional issues regarding vagueness may also arise if
certain types of corporate conduct were subject to prosecution
under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. The void-for-
75 FN. CRisTs INQU]RY COMM'N, THE FINANC[AL Cisis INQuIRY REPORT xviii, xxvii,
xix, xxi, xxii (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf.
76 Id. at 414 (Dissenting Statement of Keith Hennessey, Douglas Holtz-Eakin, and
Bill Thomas).
" Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc.,
to Shareholders 15 (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway
.comllettersl2002pdf.pdf.
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vagueness analysis looks to whether a statute provides fair notice
about what conduct constitutes a crime and whether the
prohibition is so broad that it would permit the government to
pursue arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.7 8 The Supreme
Court has been particularly concerned that a broadly defined
offense that relies on standards like fiduciary duty might result in
prosecutions based more on the personal predilections of
individual prosecutors than an application of fair standards.7 9 In
Skilling, the Court warned against adopting a statute reaching
undisclosed conflicts of interest "while purporting to act in the
interests of those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty," because
"[t]hat formulation . . . leaves many questions unanswered. How
direct or significant does the conflicting financial interest have to
be? To what extent does the official action have to further that
interest in order to amount to fraud? To whom should the
disclosure be made, and what information should it convey?"8 0 If a
corporate official could be punished based only on what a
subordinate did, then similar questions about culpability could be
raised, especially for offenses like mail and wire fraud that carry
potential sentences of thirty years imprisonment for each
violation.81
If corporate officers could be charged with crimes based on
their negligent failure to prevent widespread financial harm, or
even be held strictly liable, the question would then become: how
do we define the types of decisions that would be subject to the
criminal prohibition?8 2 Buying and selling securities tied to
" See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) ("As generally stated, the void-
far-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.").
* Id at 358 ("Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections."') (quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)).
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 411 n.44 (2010).
51 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2012).
For example, the controversy over the failure by General Motors to timely recall
vehicles with a defective ignition switch that caused at least thirteen deaths was
blamed largely on negligence by lower level employees with senior management kept in
the dark about the problem, at least according to a report of the company's internal
investigation. See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Cites Years of Neglect Over Fatal Defect,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/business/gm-ignition-
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subprime loans or offering mortgages to those with questionable
financial means-the so-called liars' loans8 3-is legal, even if a
questionable business decision. At what point do those activities
become such a threat that a responsible corporate officer should
have taken steps to prevent the likely harm, assuming such an ex
ante assessment could be made? Unlike a manager aware of a rat
infestation at a food storage facility or a supervisor learning of
problems with waste disposal who does nothing to thwart the
expected violation, the financial impact from otherwise legal
transactions may not be known for months or even years, if ever.
If the responsible corporate officer doctrine was used in
conjunction with a negligence standard for corporate decisions
that turn out to cause significant financial harm to investors and
the economy, then management can be expected to avoid policies
and investments that involve any appreciable threat of triggering
significant losses. But such loss avoidance runs counter to the
usual approach to corporate decision-making; a certain measure of
risk must be undertaken to develop a business and generate
reasonable returns. The only approach virtually guaranteed to
involve no appreciable risk of loss is doing nothing, but that also
means there will be little if any return on investment.
Extending criminal liability to officials in financial
industries, as well as other lines of business that can have a broad
economic impact based on the responsible corporate officer
doctrine, could have the effect of deterring investments that create
jobs and grow the economy. There is risk in any transaction, and
while it is easy to say that "excessive" risk-taking should be
deterred, defining what is outside acceptable bounds is not easy to
do. Using the responsible corporate officer doctrine to impose
liability on corporate executives in a manner similar to drug
switch-internal-recall-investigation-report.htmL If executives were unaware of the
problem, then it would be difficult to pursue a prosecution against them even under the
more forgiving "responsible corporate officer" doctrine.
8 See Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future
Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243, 1257 (2011) ("As the subprime market developed in the
mid-2000s, prospective borrowers were encouraged to be unscrupulous by the explosion
of the so-called 'liars' loans.' These loans evolved from stated income loans, in which
the borrower did not need to document income and that made some sense for a self-
employed person, into 'stated asset' loans, in which the borrower need document
neither income nor assets.").
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safety and environmental cases might end up causing much more
economic harm than good, even if it would make it easier to
prosecute corporate officials for decisions that turn out badly.
II. GERMANY'S ABUSE OF TRUST STATUTE
Unlike the United States, Germany does not permit a
corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) to be prosecuted for a violation of
the criminal law.8 4 There are, however, quasi-criminal sanctions
that can be imposed on a company by means of the German
Administrative Offenses Act (Ordrungs widrigkeitengesetz)
(OWiG), such as forfeiture and fines.85
Among the tools available to German prosecutors is Section
266 of the German criminal code (Strafgesetzbuch), the crime of
breach of trust (Untreue) by a corporate officer:
Any person who by law, administrative delegation or contract
has dispositional power over the assets of others or power to
commit these assets to a third party, abuses and breaches the
duty laid on him by law, administrative delegation or trust
relationship to protect the property interests of another, and
in this way causes damage to the property interests that he
8 See Martin Base, Corporate Criminal Liability in Germany, in CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERCENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 227, 228 (Mark Pieth &
Radha Ivory eds,, 2011) ("[Tjhe German Penal Code does not provide for the imposition
of criminal sanctions on corporations. In drafting the code in 1870, the German
legislator adhered to a notion of personal guilt that could not be applied to
corporations; following the ancient rule, societas delinquere non potest, it limited
criminal liability to natural persons.").
- Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz [OWiG] [Code of Administrative Offenses], May 24,
1968, BUNDESGESETZBLAP [BGBL.] I at 481, repromulgated Feb. 19, 1987, BGBL. I at
602, last amended Oct. 10, 2013, BGBL. I at 3796, § 30 (Ger). See Roland Hefendehl,
Corporate Criminal Liability: Model Penal Code Section 2.07 and the Development in
Western Legal Systems, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 283, 286 (2000) ("In Germany, liability is
imposed on corporations by state authorities only for administrative offenses. There is
much debate about whether such penalties should be considered criminal sanctions or
morally neutral administrative penalties. The German law of Ordnungswidrigheiten
(administrative penalties) empowers administrative authorities as well as criminal
courts to impose administrative fines (Geldbuen) on both natural persons and
companies.").
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should protect, shall be punished with arrest of up to five
years or with a monetary fineA6
The statute requires proof of an abuse or breach of duty that
"causes damage to the property interests that he should protect."8 7
The source of that duty in the corporate context is Section 93 of
the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), which imposes
an obligation on both the management board and the supervisory
board to "employ the care of a diligent and conscientious
manager."88 For a company organized under foreign law but
operating in Germany, the foreign jurisdiction's requirements for
corporate directors and officers will determine whether there is a
breach of duty for a violation.89 German corporate law provides
that there is no violation of duty "if, at the time of taking the
8 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, last
amended Apr. 23, 2014, BCBL. I at 410, § 266 (Ger.), translated in Franklin A.
Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative Light, 55 AM. J. CoMp, L. 453, 461 (2007).
8 Id.
8 Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBi.. I at 1089, last
amended July 23, 2013, BGBL. I at 2706, § 93(1) (Ger.), translated in Thomas J. Andre,
Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German
Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL, L. REv. 1819, 1824 (1996). German corporations have two
separate boards: the supervisory hoard (Aufsichtsrat) and the management board
(Vorstand). Andre, supra, at 1523. The supervisory board appoints the members of the
management board, which is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the company.
Id. The supervisory board is charged with supervision of the management board, much
like the directors of an American corporation are responsible for monitoring
management but do not get involved in the daily decisions of running a business. Id. at
1823-24. But the supervisory board has a broader mandate, so that "the supervisory
board concept originated as a kind of substitute for regulation that had previously been
undertaken by the state, and indeed, the Aktiengesetz [German corporate code] itself
clearly envisions a much stricter separation of board functions than exists on a unitary
board." Id. at 1824. Today, "the supervisory board is now significantly involved in the
decision-making process on a company's overall strategic concept and on management
decisions of fundamental importance." Jan Lieder, The German Supervisory Board on
Its Way to Professionalism, 11 GERMAN L.J. 115, 117 (2010). Unlike the board of
directors of a United States corporation, however, supervisory boards of large German
corporations "must have twenty seats (twenty-one seats in the coal and steel sector),
half of which must be filled by labor." Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate
Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 24
(2011).
89 See Manuel Ladiges, Criminal Liability of Directors of a Private Limited
Company Seated in Germany, 24 CRIM. L.F. 87, 103 (2013) ("Since the company law of
the incorporation state is authoritative for the defendant's duties as a director, the
Federal Supreme Court held, that German courts must interpret § 266(1) StGB in the
light of the relevant foreign company law.,").
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entrepreneurial decision, they had good reason to assume that
they were acting on the basis of adequate information for the
benefit of the company." 90 This is similar to the Business
Judgment Rule employed in the United States to evaluate the
decisions of corporate officers and directors. Under Delaware law,
the predominant jurisdiction for articulating American corporate
law, there "is a presumption that 'in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company [and its shareholders]."' 9 1
An important distinction from the obligations of directors in
the United States is that the German supervisory board members
must act only for the benefit of the organization
(Unlernehmensinteresse) distinct from its owners, including
stakeholders.9 2 They must safeguard the company's property so
that it is used only for the benefit of the business as a continuing
entity. The supervisory board, which includes union
representation, does not owe duties directly to the shareholders
and must protect the interests of employees.98 Supervisory board
members do not participate in the day-to-day decisions regarding
90 Aktiengesetz [AktGJ [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, last
amended July 23, 2013, BGBL. I at 2706, § 93(1) (Ger.), translated in NORTON ROSE
LLP, STOCK CORPORATION ACT 48 (2011), available at http://www.nortonroseful
bright.com/files/german-stock-corporation-act-20 10-english-translation-pdf- 59656.pdf.
9' See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (quoting Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
92 See Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection
Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 AM. J. COMP. L.
31, 54-55 (2005) ("The duties provided for by law flow from the duty of loyalty that each
supervisory board member owes to the corporation. The purpose of these duties,
however, is by no means exclusively to protect the interests of the shareholders. The
majority position is that the supervisory board must primarily protect the interests of
the firm (Unternehmensinteresse)."); Florian Stamm, A Comparative Study of
Monitoring of Management in German and U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley:
Where Are the German Enrons, WorldCons, and Tycos?, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 813,
826 (2004) ("Beyond the general standard of care, there is a duty to act affirmatively on
behalf of the corporation.").
93 See Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-
Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUs. 641, 678 (2011)
('The German corporate governance system is notorious for its focus on stakeholder
interests. The main reason is codetermination on German supervisory boards, which
creates a limited, but significant influence of employees on corporate decision-making
by granting them a number of mandatory seats.").
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the company's operations, and the direct obligation to protect the
company's assets falls to the managerial board members.9 4 As
such, the supervisory board's obligation is to oversee the
managerial board,9 5 so Section 266 is one means to enforce the
obligation of corporate officials to put the company's best interests
first if decisions result in significant damage to the enterprise.
Section 266 has been used in two high profile prosecutions of
corporate officials in Germany: the Mannesmann AG award of
additional compensation to its former chief executive by members
of the supervisory board,96 and the payment of overseas bribes by
employees of Siemens AG.97 These cases illustrate the potential
breadth of pursuing corporate executives for an abuse of trust
based on damage to the company from their decisions.
The Mannesmann case arose from the first successful hostile
takeover of a German corporation when Vodafone PLC acquired
the company in 2000.98 Klaus Esser became Mannesmann's CEO
in 1999 after serving as its chief financial officer.99 In 2000, after
protracted negotiations, he helped secure a significant increase in
the offer price from Vodafone, generating approximately £63
billion in increased value for the shareholders. 0 0 Members of a
"non-executive compensation committee" of Mannesmann's
supervisory board were responsible for determining the
compensation of its executives, and awarded Esser a £15 million
payment on the day the transaction closed: a reward for his work
in negotiating a higher bid.1oi Other corporate officers also
received bonuses, totaling C60 million, and the disclosure of the
awards caused an immediate outcry in Germany.1OS The initial
9 See Stamm, supra note 92, at 827.
9- Id.
N See generally Peter Kolla, The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts, 5
GERMAN L.J. 829 (2004).
" See generally Markus Adick, Risks for Firms and Their Executives in Cases of
Corruption-An Overview with Particular Regard to the Siemens Case, NEW J. EUR.
CRIM. L, (SPECIAL EDITION) 25 (2009).
9 See Kolla, supra note 96, at 829.
9 See Gevurtz, supra note 86, at 460.
1oo Id.
10, See Kolla, supra note 96, at 832.
102 Id.
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claim was that these were bribes paid to management to persuade
them to go along with the Vodafone offer. 03
Esser and other members of the supervisory board, including
former Deutsche Bank CEO Dr. Josef Ackermann, were charged
with violating Section 266 by a local prosecutor in Dilsseldorf. 04
The highly anticipated proceeding-described as "the first criminal
trial in Germany against leading persons of a stock corporation"-
ended with the trial court acquitting the defendants. 05 Although
the judge found that they had breached a fiduciary duty to the
company, they did not violate the criminal provision because
Section 266 was limited to only an "aggravated" breach of duty.106
This did not occur because the company's profits were never
threatened and the supervisory board members "did not have an
unlawful purpose."107 As one commentator noted, "the judge
pointed out that it was the court's obligation to decide whether the
defendants' behaviour was relevant for criminal law, not to
estimate corporate culture by making moral or value
judgments." 08
The prosecutor appealed to the German Federal Court of
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) (BGH), which reversed the acquittal
and returned the case to the lower court.109 The BGH rejected the
103 Id. at 832-33. ("Allegations of bribery initially surrounded Esser's appreciation
award. Esser had spent over £200 million resisting Vodafone's hostile takeover bid, and
questions arose as to whether the award had improperly bought Esser's support for the
takeover.").
10o See Gevurtz, supra note 86, at 460-62.
105 Max Philipp Rolshoven, The Last Word?-The July 22, 2004 Acquittals in the
Mannesmann 2'Trial, 5 GERMAN L.J. 935, 936 (2004).
10 See Govurtz, supra note 86, at 462.
1*7 Id. ("The trial court concluded that, while the directors had breached their duty
in awarding the bonus, they were not criminally liable, This was because, according to
the trial court, there must be an 'aggravated' breach of duty in order for a business
judgment to violate Section 266 of the Penal Code. In this case, the trial court found
the breach was not aggravated, because the company's profits were high and the
continuity and the profitability of the company were never threatened, the decision was
made diligently and in a transparent manner in accordance with the allocation of
responsibility within the company, and the members of the Supervisory Board did not
have an unlawful purpose.").
log Rolshoven, supra note 105, at 940.
"I' See Gevurtz, supra note 86, at 462. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause in the
United States, a judicial acquittal based on insufficient evidence could not be appealed
to a higher court. See, e.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (holding
that acquittal by directed verdict cannot be appealed by the prosecution); United States
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argument that Section 266 was too indefinite-"vague" in the
parlance of United States law-to be enforced, finding that it met
the requirements of Article 103(2) of the Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz).110 That provision states, "An
act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal
offense before the act was committed.""' The BGH further found
that a violation of Section 266 did not require a "serious" breach of
the supervisory board's duty to the company.112 The case was sent
back to the lower court for consideration of whether the
defendants could offer an "ignorance of the law" defense 13 under
Section 17 of the Criminal Code, which provides, "If at the time of
the commission of the offence the offender lacks the awareness
that he is acting unlawfully, he shall be deemed to have acted
without guilt if the mistake was unavoidable."1 4 The defendants
subsequently agreed to pay £5.8 million before a second trial, and
the prosecutor dropped the charges." 5
In the second high profile case, a former manager at Siemens
AG and an outside consultant were convicted of violating Section
266 for creating a "slush fund" with corporate assets used to pay
bribes to foreign government officials to win contracts for the
company.1 16 Under United States law, this would be a violation of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits giving
anything of value to any person affiliated with another
government to "obtain[ or retain[] business" in that country117
While Germany has also made such conduct a crime, that offense
did not become punishable until 2002, and at least some of the
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (holding that "acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict
of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may
not be appealed").
110 Stefan Maier, A Close Look at the Mannesmann Trial, 7 GERMAN L.J. 603, 606-
07 (2006).
"' Id. at 606 n.21.
n Id. at 608.
11 See Gevurtz, supra note 86, at 462.
114 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, last
amended Apr. 23, 2014, BGBL. I at 410, § 17 (Ger.), translation available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-stgb/englisch stgb.html ("If the mistake
was avoidable, the sentence may be mitigated pursuant to section 49(1).").
"5 See Gevurtz, supra note 86, at 462.
118 See Adick, supra note 97, at 25.
n1 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
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payments at issue occurred before that date.1 18 The abuse of trust
statute permitted prosecutors to pursue the case because the
corporate officer's misuse of funds breached his fiduciary duty to
the company and exposed it to potential harm, even though the
goal of the illicit payments was to assist Siemens to acquire
additional business."i9 The company itself paid a total of $1.6
billion in fines, penalties and disgorgement, including $800
million to the Department of Justice and the SEC, to settle
criminal and civil cases in the United States and Germany for the
bribes.1 20
The conviction was appealed to the Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) (BVerfG), which reviewed it
along with two other cases involving violations of Section 266.121
In one prosecution, the chairman of a health insurance company
funneled premiums to employees in excess of their salary and
other compensation beyond what he was authorized to provide.' 22
In the other, members of the board of Berlin-Hannoversche
Hypothekenbank authorized a real estate loan without the proper
information and investigation which would have shown it was not
adequately secured. 2 3 The BVerfG rejected the argument that the
statute was unconstitutional, finding that it met the requirements
of Article 103(2) because the courts had interpreted the provision
with enough precision so that there were appreciable boundaries
to the law. 124 The court rejected the conviction of the bank board
members, however, because it found there was no crime of
attempted abuse of trust. 2 5 The corporate decision that is alleged
to constitute a violation of Section 266 must result in harm at the
- See Adick, supra note 97, at 27.
119 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, last
amended Apr. 23, 2014, BGBL. I at 410, § 266 (Ger.)
120 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries
Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million
in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http:lwww.justice.gov/opalpr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
L See Press Release, Fed. Constitutional Court of Ger. Press Office, Constitutional
Complaints Against Convictions for Abuse of Trust Partially Successful (Aug. 11,
2010), available at http://www.bverfg.delenL/press/bvglO-080en.html.
122 Id.
MN Id.
12 Id.
125 Id.
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time it was made, not just that there be "harm by endangerment"
depending on how the transaction develops. 2 6
The issue of excessive executive compensation in the
Mannesmann case is usually addressed in the United States
through a shareholder derivative suit, although such challenges
generally fail. For example, questions about the $140 million paid
by Disney to a former CEO whose short tenure was fraught with
difficulties resulted in a finding that the board of directors did not
breach its fiduciary duty in approving the pay package.1 27 The
standard the Delaware court applied was whether the payment
constituted corporate waste, which requires a showing of bad
faith. 2 8 Although the BGH did not explain what level of intent
was required to violate Section 266 in the Mannesmann case, the
availability of the defense provided in Section 17 for a mistake
indicates that there must be some measure of intentionality
because a lack of awareness that conduct is unlawful can prevent
a conviction. In the Siemens case, the question of intent was not
considered because the corporate official knew that the funds were
to be used for an improper purpose, even if there was no intent to
cause harm to the enterprise.
The contours of Section 266 can be discerned from these
cases. The statute is quite broad in its application, available for
any corporate misconduct that results in a loss to the entity. 2 9
The key to proving a violation is the harm to the organization, not
that the defendant realized any personal gain from the
misconduct. While the normal measure of harm in the corporate
context would be in monetary terms, such as in a fraud case, there
is no balancing of interests like an assessment of whether the
impact was substantial or that shareholders realized a greater
benefit even if the entity suffered a comparatively small loss. The
mistake of law defense available to a defendant accused of a
Section 266 violation shows the conduct must at least be reckless
by triggering a direct risk of loss, not merely negligent. A manager
126 Id.; see Strafgesetzbuch [StGB) [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BOBL. I at 3322,
last amended Apr. 23, 2014, BGBL. I at 410, § 266 (Ger.).
127 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 260-62 (Del. 2000).
126 Id. at 263.
129 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code], Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, last
amended Apr. 23, 2014, BCBL, Iat 410, § 266 (Ger.).
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pursuing an informed decision, particularly one based on legal
advice from competent attorneys, will be able to avoid liability. In
addition, the decision that causes harm to the enterprise must
have an immediate effect, even if it does not come to light until
years later, like the overseas bribery at Siemens. It is not a
violation when the harm is only traceable to a risky-but
defensible-business decision that turned out to cause a loss, like
the bank loan at Berlin-Hannoversche Hypothekenbank.
Section 266 resembles the "right of honest services" theory of
mail and wire fraud in the United States, which was available for
prosecutions before 2010, when the Supreme Court restricted its
scope in Shilling u. United States.30 The federal statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346, provides that a deprivation of the intangible right of
honest services is treated like a fraud involving money or
property. Along the same lines as the breach of trust that causes
harm to an organization punishable under Section 266, the right
of honest services was applied in cases in which corporate officials
breached their fiduciary duty to the company in the hope of
realizing some benefit; the theory was applicable as long as the
company suffered some detriment to its interests, even if the
company did not have any monetary harm or was not even the
source of the benefit. 3 1 Thus, a conflict of interest or self-dealing
could be the basis for a mail or wire fraud conviction even if the
party to whom the honest services were owed did not lose
anything directly.1 2
no 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010).
1-1 The Second Circuit explained the theory of honest services fraud this way:
[A] scheme or artifice to use the mails or wires to enable an officer or
employee of a private entity (or a person in a relationship that gives rise to a
duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to employers)
purporting to act for and in the interests of his or her employer (or of the
other person to whom the duty of loyalty is owed) secretly to act in his or her
or the defendant's own interests instead, accompanied by a material
misrepresentation made or omission of information disclosed to the employer
or other person.
United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2003).
112 Perhaps the broadest statement of the honest services doctrine came in United
States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), in which a law firm partner (and state
senator) was convicted for not disclosing to a client that he was representing the
interests of a competitor seeking a government contract. According to the Second
Circuit, "[a]lthough a mere breach of fiduciary duty, standing alone, may not
necessarily constitute a mail fraud, the concealment by a fiduciary of material
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For example, in United States v. Black,'3 3 a former CEO,
Conrad Black, and other executives at a publicly traded media
company were convicted of mail and wire fraud for their conduct
in negotiating agreements to sell chains of small newspapers and
then diverting a portion of the funds under the guise of non-
competition agreements and management fees.1 34 Prosecutors
accused Black of committing fraud under two theories: as an
ordinary fraud, in which the company lost the funds by
embezzlement or theft; and for depriving the intangible right of
honest services by putting his own interests ahead of the
organization.1 3 5 On the honest services theory, the jury was
instructed that "all it had to find was that in failing to disclose the
recharacterization of the management fees to the audit committee
and the board, they had failed to render honest services to
Hollinger and had done so in an effort to obtain a private gain."1 36
In Skilling, the Supreme Court narrowed the right of honest
services theory of fraud to "only the bribe-and-kickback core" that
had been prosecuted before the enactment of § 1346 in 1988.137
information which he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where
the non-disclosure could or does result in harm to the other is a violation of the
statute." Id. at 926 (citations omitted).
rM 625 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 2010),
11 The Seventh Circuit described one of the transactions in this way:
The first of these counts concerns a subsidiary of Hollinger called APC, which
owned a number of small community newspapers that it was in the process of
selling. When it had only one left-a weekly community newspaper serving
Mammoth Lake, California (population 7,093 in 2000, the year before the
fraud)-defendant Kipnis, Hollinger's general counsel, prepared and signed on
behalf of APC an agreement to pay the other defendants, plus another
Hollinger executive, a total of $5.5 million in exchange for their promising not
to compete with APC for three years after they stopped working for Hollinger.
The money was paid. Neither Hollinger's audit committee, which was
required to approve transactions between Hollinger's executives and the
company or its subsidiaries (such as APC) because of the conflict of interest,
nor Hollinger's board of directors, was informed of this transaction. That
Black and the others might start a paper in Mammoth Lake to compete with
APC's tiny newspaper there was a ridiculous idea; no one would pay them to
promise not to do something they obviously would never want to do.
Id. at 391.
1s5 Id.
uss Id.
13 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 958, 409 (2010). Congress adopted the statute
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350
(1987), which held that the mail and wire fraud statutes did not reach schemes to
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The Court rejected the government's argument that the statute
also applied to self-dealing and non-disclosure cases in which
there was an element of deception that constituted a scheme to
defraud the right of honest services, finding that "[in light of the
relative infrequency of conflict-of-interest prosecutions in
comparison to bribery and kickback charges, and the intercircuit
inconsistencies they produced, we conclude that a reasonable
limiting construction of § 1346 must exclude this amorphous
category of cases."' 3 8 By limiting the statute to only bribery and
kickback cases, the Court found the provision was sufficiently
clear and that it was not unconstitutionally vague,' 8 9 Skilling did
not explain exactly what constitutes a kickback, a much more
amorphous term than bribery, but both terms connote the
defendant receiving something the person was not entitled to,
which is provided by someone with an interest in the underlying
transaction. 140
Unlike Section 266, which focuses on the harm to the entity
owed the fiduciary duty, Skilling made the key to proving a right
of honest services fraud case an improper gain realized by the
defendant, without regard to any harm suffered by the company.
That distinction makes this theory much less useful in prosecuting
instances of corporate mismanagement resulting in substantial
harm to the enterprise and even the wider public. In Skilling, the
Court noted that the government's honest services theory at trial
rested on the chief executive's misstatements about the company
resulting in his receiving salary and bonuses, along with selling
shares at an inflated value, thus showing the benefits he received
from his dishonesty.14 1 That was insufficient, however, because
there was no allegation that the defendant "solicited or accepted
defraud the citizens of the intangible right of honest services, but only money or
property. The Court stated, "Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves
its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting
standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read §
1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights." Id. at 360.
M Skilling, 561 U.S. at 410.
'9 Id. at 412 ("Interpreted to encompass only bribery and kickback schemes, § 1346
is not unconstitutionally vague.").
14 Like the Supreme Court did in Shilling, the Seventh Circuit reversed Black's
honest services conviction and remanded the case for further review by the lower
courts. See Black, 625 F.3d at 393-94.
141 Shilling, 561 U.S. at 413.
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side payments from a third party in exchange for making these
misrepresentations."14 2 Thus, unless it can be shown that an
executive manipulated the company to increase the compensation
that would be paid, or triggered bonuses or other forms of
remuneration the person was not otherwise entitled to, it will be
impossible to bring a fraud prosecution based on risky decisions
that might have caused only substantial and unjustifiable harm to
the company. If the manager stays within the terms of the
employment contract, then a breach of a fiduciary duty, even one
accompanied by deception, will fall outside the scope of the mail
and wire fraud statutes and not be subject to prosecution as an
honest services violation.
At one time, there was an apparent overlap between Section
266 of the German criminal code for an abuse of trust and § 1346's
definition of fraud based on a deprivation of the right of honest
services, in that both focused on a violation of a corporate official's
obligations to the organization as the basis for imposing criminal
liability. Now, Skilling has made the United States fraud law
much less effective in policing corporate decision-making that
inflicts substantial damage on the company and the wider
economy. The Mannesmann prosecution began with the view that
the company's CEO was bribed to permit the merger, but
prosecutors dropped that theory because the extra compensation
appeared to be only a reward, which does not constitute a bribe
because there is no quid pro quo arrangement.1 43 While the
purported harm to the company was sufficient to bring the case
within Section 266, it could not be charged as a violation of the
right of honest services statute after Skilling without relying on
the bribery theory rejected by the German prosecutors.1 44
42 Id.
u See, e.g., United States v. Bruno, 661 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2011) ("Bruno argues
that the government failed to provide sufficient proof of a quid pro quo, an essential
element of a bribery theory of honest services fraud. We disagree. A quid pro quo is a
government official's receipt of a benefit in exchange for an act he has performed, or
promised to perform, in the course of the exercise of his official authority.") (citation
omitted).
144 Germany adopted a much narrower provision targeting senior executives of
banks and insurance companies who fail to comply with risk management procedures
in violation of an administrative directive. Kreditwesengesetz [KWG] [Banking Act],
Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I at 2776, last amended July 15, 2014, BGBL. I at 934, § 54a
(Ger.). The new portion of the Act, which went into effect on January 1, 2014, makes it
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III. BRITAIN'S RECKLESS BANKER LAW
The financial crisis hit the British banking sector as hard as
any country's in the world, with government bail-outs of banks
like Royal Bank of Scotland, Northern Rock, and HBOS requiring
the government to provide over £1 trillion in support.1 45 The
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (Commission)
issued a report on the demise of HBOS, once the leading mortgage
and savings institution in the country, with the title "An accident
waiting to happen." 146 The Commission chairman described its
demise as "one of catastrophic failures of management,
governance and regulatory oversight." 147 The Commission's final
report, "Changing banking for good," begins by pointing out that
[t]oo many bankers, especially at the most senior levels, have
operated in an environment with insufficient personal
responsibility. Top bankers dodged accountability for failings
on their watch by claiming ignorance or hiding behind
collective decision-making. They then faced little realistic
prospect of financial penalties or more serious sanctions
commensurate with the severity of the failures with which
they were associated. Individual incentives have not been
a crime to fail to comply with the duties imposed to manage risks if it "threatens the
bank's viability as a going concern." Id., translated in Thomas Richter, The New
German Ringfencing Act Establishing Criminal Liability of Banking and Insurance
Executives for Failures in Risk Management: A Step Towards Corporate Criminal
Liability?, in REGULATING CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY .321, 323 (Dominik
Brodowski et al. eds., 2014). A significant limitation on liability requires that the
official contravene a specific order issued by the Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (BundesanstaltfiirFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) to remedy the company's
failure to implement sufficient risk mechanisms. Richter, supra, at 323. Although the
law targets senior management who put a financial institution at risk, the criminal
penalty will apply only in very narrow circumstances in which an express
administrative order is ignored. Id.
145 See Taxpayer Support for UK Banks: FAQs, U.K. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE,
http://www.nao.org.uklhighlightsltaxpayer-support.for-uk-banks-faqs/ (last updated
Mar. 31, 2013) (showing peak support for banks was £1,162 billion).
146 PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, 'AN ACCIDENT WAITING
TO HAPPEN': THE FAILURE OF HBOS, 2012-13, H.L. 144, H.C. 705 (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201 21 3/jtselect/jtpcbs/144/144.pdf.
147 Press Release, Parliamentary Comm'n on Banking Standards, Failure of HBOS
Linked to "Colossal Failure of Senior Management and the Board," Says Banking
Commission (Apr. 5, 2013), available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/
committees/committees-a-zjoint-select/professional-standards-in-the-banking-
industry/news/an-accident-waiting-to-happen-the-failure-of-hbos/.
76 [VOL. 84:1
2014] NEW CRIME FOR CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
consistent with high collective standards, often the
opposite.1 48
In its recommendations for reforming regulation of banks,
the Commission suggested that Parliament enact "a new criminal
offence of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank." 4 9
The crime would be limited to senior bank officials, and they
would be prosecuted in "cases involving only the most serious of
failings, such as where a bank failed with substantial costs to the
taxpayer, lasting consequences for the financial system, or serious
harm to customers."16 0 The report noted that there were a number
of problems with using a lower standard for proving intent, such
as strict liability or negligence, because, inter alia, it would be
more difficult to attract talented individuals to work for a
struggling bank and there would be a reasonable likelihood that
courts would resist imposing a significant punishment for a
conviction based on such a low level of personal fault.15 ' Thus,
reckless conduct leading to significant economic harm is the
Commission's suggested means for establishing criminal liability,
with a recommendation that offenders face prison terms,
potentially up to ten years, upon conviction.1 52
The British Treasury Department endorsed the
recommendation for a new criminal offense for bankers, stating
that it "will be a helpful deterrent against misconduct which can
result in severe economic disruption and considerable losses for
taxpayers."15s The focus is on deterrence: the possibility for
148 PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR
GOOD VOL. 1, 2013-14, H.L. 27-1, HLC. 175-1, at 8 (U.K.), available at
http://www.parliament.ukidocuments/banking-commission/Banking-final-report-
volume-i.pdf.
"4 Id. at 66.
ISO Id.
P ARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, CHANGING BANKING FOR
GOOD VOL. II, 2013-14, H.L. 27-11, H.C. 175-II, at 513-14 (U.K.), available at
httpJ/www.parliament.uk/documents/banking-conmission/Banking-final-report-vol-
ii.pdf.
162 Id, at 515-16.
153 HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY & DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND
SKILLS, THE GovERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON
BANKING STANDARDS, 2013, Cm. 8661, at 12 (U.K.), available at
https://www.gov.uk/governmentuploads/systemiluploadslattachmentdatafile/211047 / g
ovresponseto the parliamentarycommissionon banking-standards.pdf
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criminal prosecution will lead senior banking officials to be less
likely to adopt policies and undertake new efforts that put both
the organization and the broader economy at risk. 54
As adopted by Parliament in December 2013, the new
criminal provision is narrow, applying only to senior management
of a financial institution who make a decision, or fail to take steps
to prevent a decision, that results in the failure of the bank. To
prove a violation, the prosecutor must establish the following:
(b) at the time of the decision, [the person] is aware of a risk
that the implementation of the decision may cause the failure
of the group institution,
(c) in all the circumstances, [the person]'s conduct in relation
to the taking of the decision falls far below what could
reasonably be expected of a person in [that] position, and
(d) the implementation of the decision causes the failure of
the group institution. 155
The maximum punishment for a conviction upon an
indictment is seven years in prison and a fine.1 56 The law
incorporates the recklessness standard as the requisite intent for
a violation. It includes a subjective element involving the
defendant's awareness of the risk stemming from a particular
decision, and the objective requirement that the conduct be "far
below" what a reasonable person in a similar position would have
i4 A rebuttable presumption was one proposed measure to reform banking
practices in the United Kingdom and make enforcement more effective, by
"[e]stablishing rules which would automatically ban senior executives and directors of
failing banks from future positions of responsibility in financial services unless they
could positively demonstrate that they were active in identifying, arguing against and
seeking to rectify the causes of failure." See PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION ON BANKING
STANDARDS, supra note 151, at 503-04. The rationale behind this approach was that it
removes discretion from the regulator on whether to pursue an action, and overcomes
much of the challenge of proving individual culpability. Another option considered was
"reversing the burden of proof in cases where a significant failing has been identified."
Id. at 506. This would require executives in a managerial role to show they have taken
"all reasonable steps to avoid the failing concerned." Id. One problem with this
approach, however, is that it comes close to imposing strict liability based on the losses
caused, which could only be avoided if the executive could establish his or her
reasonableness.
1' Banking Reform Act, 2013, c. 33, §§ 36(1)(b)-(d) (U.K.).
15 Id. § 36(4)(b).
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done.' 57 The offense is of limited application because it requires
proof that the decision caused the financial institution to fail,
which occurs when it is insolvent or subject to being taken over by
the government due to its financial difficulties.158
Bank executives would not be subject to prosecution for
decisions that, though they did damage the enterprise, did not
threaten the continuing existence of the financial institution. 5 9
The statute also refers to a "decision"160 in the singular, which
means the prosecution would need to identify a particular
corporate act, or perhaps a series of related acts, as the reason for
the bank's failure. It is often difficult to identify any one act or
failure as the "cause" of a company's demise, especially when it is
a large organization subject to a number of different economic
pressures. Therefore successfully prosecuting an executive for a
bank's failure under this new provision may be inordinately
difficult if the insolvency was the result of distinct reasons that
combined to put it out of business. It may be a valid defense to
argue that no single decision resulted in the failure or constituted
recklessness standing alone, which may result in an acquittal,
even if many separate actions combined to undermine the
organization's viability.
In relying on deterrence as the justification for adopting this
provision, Britain has enacted a law that could result in
discouraging business decisions that could bring significant
benefits to an organization if it turns out well. Thus, defining
what constitutes a violation is crucial to this new law because,
otherwise, it simply becomes a vehicle for post hoc discipline for
decisions that turn out badly. Although Senator Elizabeth Warren
said that "[blanks should be boring,"""1 any business requires
some measure of risk if it is going to prosper, because not every
loan is guaranteed to be repaid, nor is every loss from a
transaction the result of faulty decision-making. This new crime
' Id, § 36(1)(c).
"1 d. § 37(9).
'1 Id. § 36(1)(b).
'Go Id.
Il, See Jim Puzzanghera, Sen. Elizabeth Warren Starts Campaign to Force Banks to
Be Boring, CHI. TRIB. (July 12, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/breaking/la-fi-mo-elizabeth-warren-banks-boring-glass-steagall-20130712-
stury.html.
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may push bankers into adopting a more defensive approach to
managing the business so that they can avoid any claim that they
had acted improperly. That conservative approach may be an
acceptable cost of preventing large-scale losses in the banking
sector, because the policy, whether implicitly or explicitly,
acknowledges that some financial institutions are so important
that they are "too big to fail" and therefore significant risks need
to be avoided. In that environment, a crime that allows for
punishment of a bank officer who tests the government's resolve to
preserve the financial system may be worthwhile. But if banks are
expected to make profits from their activities, then taking fewer
risks will result in lower returns, an outcome that may not be
acceptable to investors, even if it works to protect the broader
economy.
IV. CONSTRUCTING A NEW CRIME FOR CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
The German abuse of trust offense and the British statute
targeting bank mismanagement provide a framework for how a
new law in the United States could be drafted to permit criminal
prosecution of business decisions that result in a large-scale loss-a
law that would not be an exercise in second-guessing. There are
three points that the law would need to touch on to distinguish it
from other provisions that have been used in the past against
corporate executives, like the right of honest services theory of
fraud: (1) the types of organizations subject to its proscription; (2)
the intent level required to prove a violation; and (3) the type of
conduct that will result in liability.
Regarding the potential scope of a new law, the British
statute is narrower than the German abuse of trust provision or
the right of honest services statute. Those laws are not limited to
a single sector of the economy, and instead apply to any business
organization in which there is a fiduciary duty imposed on officers
and employees. Although banking is subject to significant federal
oversight, the potential threat a business can pose to the broader
economy is not limited to only those institutions with a bank
charter. For example, insurance companies like AIG and
investment banks like Lehman Brothers were at the heart of the
financial crisis, but neither was regulated as a bank in 2008; nor
are financial companies, even broadly defined, the only ones that
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can pose a threat of significant harm to the economy. The asset
management industry in the United States, including pension
funds and mutual funds, oversees trillions of dollars6 2 and can
constitute just as much of a threat to the broader economy as a
bank or brokerage firm. To target a new statute at a particular
industry or economic sector could constrain the law too severely to
be effective.
Moreover, if the statute is designed to provide a means to
hold corporate officers responsible for decisions that inflict
significant harm, then limiting it to a single industry might create
a system in which some managers would be subject to liability
while others in a similar position could avoid prosecution. The
next financial crisis-when it comes-may be traceable to sectors
far removed from Wall Street and global financial firms. The
better approach to drafting a new law would be to focus on the
means by which an improper corporate policy or managerial
decision was implemented, without regard to whether the actor
worked at a corporation holding a bank charter or a pension fund
responsible for the financial health of thousands of workers and
retirees.
On the issue of the proper level of intent for such an offense,
the British Bank Commission makes a compelling argument that
recklessness is a workable standard for imposing criminal
liability. In the United States, the Model Penal Code defines this
as a person who
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and
the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.1 6 3
1 See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ASSET
MANAGEMENT AND FINANCAL STABILITY 1 (2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiativesiofr/researchDocuments/OFRLAMFSFINAL.pdf
("The U.S. asset management industry oversees the allocation of approximately $53
trillion in financial assets. .. .").
3 MODELPENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
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Under this approach, not only must the person disregard the
likely risks from a course of conduct, but that decision must
constitute a "gross deviation" from what can be expected by a
similarly situated executive. This goes beyond mere second-
guessing of a business decision, something that a company is
normally protected from by the Business Judgment Rule in
corporate law.1 64 Instead, proving recklessness would require the
prosecution to show that the decision was indefensible from a
business standpoint, much like the corporate law doctrine of
waste. This was essentially the standard used in the Mannesmann
case involving a violation of Section 266.165 Thus, requiring proof
of recklessness avoids imposing liability based only on the result of
a decision without giving fair consideration to whether it was the
product of a flawed process. Moreover, proof of recklessness could
be established by the failure of corporate officials to see the
potential for significant problems from a business decision due to
the inadequacy of, or complete lack of, investigation into that
possibility, much like conscious disregard of warning signs can be
a way to prove knowledge. 6 6
-" See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984)) ("Tt is the essence of the
business judgment rule that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to second guess a
board's decision, except 'in rare cases [where] a transaction may be so egregious on its
face that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment."'), aff'd in part,
revd in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
'91 See Gevurtz, supra note 86, at 463-64.
I See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Carrillo, 435
F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "[i]t is appropriate to give the ostrich
instruction where the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge, and the government
presents circumstances from which a jury could conclude that the defendant
deliberately avoided the truth"). Judge Posner once described vividly what the "ostrich
instruction" is designed to permit a jury to find
The criticism can be deflected by thinking carefully about just what it is that
real ostriches do (or at least are popularly supposed to do). They do not just
fail to follow through on their suspicions of bad things. They are not merely
careless birds. They bury their heads in the sand so that they will not see or
hear bad things. They deliberately avoid acquiring unpleasant knowledge.
The ostrich instruction is designed for cases in which there is evidence that
the defendant, knowing or strongly suspecting that he is involved in shady
dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact
knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings. A deliberate effort to
avoid guilty knowledge is all the guilty knowledge the law requires.
United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Regarding the type of conduct that could constitute a
violation, it is important to note that crimes usually involve some
external manifestation of prohibited conduct and not merely an
intent to engage in a violation. This component of the offense is
commonly referred to as the actus reus element. The act
requirement has been described by Professor Dressler as
reflecting "three ingredients of a crime, which can be encapsulated
in a single sentence: The actus reus of an offense consists of (1) a
voluntary act; (2) that causes; (3) social harm," 67 As an
alternative to prohibiting a positive action, some criminal offenses
premise liability on an omssion: the failure to act when the
person has a legal duty to engage in certain conduct to prevent
harm. 168
To shape a new crime focused on corporate mismanagement,
the starting point would be identifying a corporate policy or series
of decisions that triggered the negative economic effect. The
British statute requires that the decision cause the bank's failure,
which sets a high bar to a successful prosecution, because in a
complex business organization, ferreting out a single cause might
be impossible. Causation is an element of a crime that is based on
a result, but the corporate decision should not require proof that it
was the sole cause of the loss. Instead, if prosecutors could identify
a policy or decision as a significant contributing factor to
precipitating the harm, then that should be sufficient to prove the
crime.
For example, the recent civil enforcement action against JP
Morgan Chase for trading through its London investment office
might be the kind of conduct for which this standard could be
applied to hold individual corporate officials liable. In a cease-and-
desist order entered against the bank, issued after the corporation
admitted to the violations, the SEC found that "senior
management" failed to adequately respond to reports of significant
losses that ultimately cost the bank over $6 billion, because its
internal controls were inadequate and officers did not provide the
type of information necessary to permit the board of directors to
['7 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 85 (5th ed. 2009).
LB8 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3}(b) (1985) (stating that liability for an
omission requires that "a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by
law").
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respond appropriately. 16 9 The order describes the conduct of a
collective group comprised of JPMorgan's chief executive, chief
accounting officer, and three other high-level managers as those
responsible for the violations for both their actions and the failure
to provide information. 170 Yet, only the bank was named in the
proceeding, for which it paid a total of $920 million in penalties to
United States and British regulators.171 The conduct of the officers
was clearly a violation of their obligations under the principles of
corporate governance, resulting to some appreciable harm to the
organization. Establishing individual liability for fraud would
require proof of scienter, which means proving knowledge, or at
least recklessness, for such a civil case.1 72 A criminal prosecution
based on the recklessness of senior managers that damaged the
bank would allow prosecutors to pursue cases similar to what is
already the subject of SEC enforcement actions, and could be an
important tool for situations in which the conduct by senior
management is particularly harmful to the enterprise.
An interesting issue that arises in carving out a new offense
is whether inaction alone could be sufficient to trigger liability, at
least where there were sufficient indicators of potential significant
harm to the enterprise and a failure to respond left the
corporation susceptible to losses. This approach would involve an
omission, which can fulfill the actus reus element of a crime so
long as there exists a duty to act. State corporate law already
imposes fiduciary duties on officers and directors to act in good
faith and in the best interest of the organization by undertaking
their roles with due care and to not engage in undisclosed self-
169 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 70458, 2013 WL 5275772
(Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigationladmin/201334-70458.pdf.
170 Id.
171 See Press Release, U.S. Soc. & Exch. Comm'n, JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay
$200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges (Sept. 19, 2013), available
at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/l370539819965. One can
question the logic of imposing civil penalties on a bank for conduct that resulted in
harm to the organization when it is the shareholders who bear both the impact of the
violation and the cost of paying for the violation.
172 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (stating that
scienter is a mental state embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud");
Tellabs, Inc. v. Maker Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) ("Every Court
of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter
requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though
the Circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required.").
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interested transactions.1 7 3 A new criminal provision could
encompass both positive action and inaction in the face of clear
danger signals, so long as either (or both) was undertaken
recklessly.
The absence of criminal prosecutions from the financial crisis
has been a reflection of the difficulty of proving a violation when a
corporate officer gained nothing from the decision beyond
otherwise permissible remuneration. In some cases, the executive
may have suffered personal financial losses from the demise of a
company when his or her shares became worthless as a result of a
bankruptcy or government bailout. The actual gain realized by
executives is not the best measure for assessing whether a
decision has been so reckless that it should result in criminal
liability, because of the significant harm inflicted on the economy
and broader segments of society. Thus, the offense should be based
on an assessment of both the recklessness of the decision-making
process and the resultant harm caused by it, and should not be
mitigated by any personal financial losses an executive may have
suffered.
Statutes in Germany and Britain focus on the harm caused
by the corporate official, unlike the Supreme Court's
interpretation of § 1346 in Skilling, as requiring proof of an illicit
gain from the breach of the duty to provide honest services. 7 4
Focusing in on harm inflicted would be a better means of policing
corporate misconduct than looking primarily at the actor's
personal gain; by extending the criminal proscription to conduct
that falls outside the mail and wire fraud statutes, which already
have proven effective when corporate officials misuse their
position for personal gain, more misdeeds will be prosecutable.
What constitutes sufficient "harm" to permit a criminal
prosecution may require a monetary threshold before a case can
be initiated. It is often problematic to provide a dollar amount for
measuring harm because almost any loss could have a significant
in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) ("'[he directors of
Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and
good faith. Those fiduciary responsibilities do not operate intermittently. Accordingly,
the shareholders of a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon their board of
directors to discharge each of their three primary fiduciary duties at all times.").
"' See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
85
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
impact under particular circumstances. A widow living off a fixed
pension or social security may be much more susceptible to harm
than a sophisticated institutional investor who can endure a
multi-million dollar decline in value. That said, the rationale of
the British statute is that the law should only be used in egregious
cases that result in a bank's failure. Although a bankruptcy
requirement is too high a threshold, a significant monetary loss
should be incorporated into the statute to avoid having any bad
decision potentially subject to criminal punishment, which would
cause managers to avoid most risks, even reasonable ones.
There is a provision of the federal criminal code that
enhances the penalty for a "major fraud against the United
States" if the value of the "grant, contract, subcontract, subsidy,
loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance, or
any constituent part thereof, is $1,000,000 or more."1lS That
provision was originally adopted in 1988, when a million dollars
was thought to be a considerable sum of money. Since then, there
have been multi-billion dollar Ponzi schemes perpetrated by
Bernie Madoffl76 and R. Alan Stanford,17 7 and even smaller ones
with losses "only" in the hundreds of millions of dollars, like those
conducted by lawyers Marc Dreier1 78 and Scott Rothstein.1 79 In
the context of the financial crisis, using a low threshold for
financial losses would make business decisions of almost any
significance subject to potential criminal prosecution.
The new statute should address serious misconduct that
causes widespread harm; so, if a monetary threshold for loss is to
be used, it must be significant, perhaps even starting at $1 billion
in investor losses or costs imposed on the government (if it were
required to protect workers and insurance funds, such as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Fund or pension insurance funds, from
flawed business decisions). That would ensure that only serious
cases of executive malfeasance are potentially subject to
prosecution, and would allow those working for smaller
'75 18 US.C. § 1031(a) (2012).
no See, e.g., In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 418 B.R. 75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009).
'" See, e.g., Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2011).
178 See, e.g., In re Dreier LLP, 452 B.R. 391 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
-1 See, e.g., ln re Rothstein, Rosenfeldt, Adler, P.A., 717 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2013).
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enterprises to undertake riskier decisions that would not have the
same type of impact on the economy.
CONCLUSION
The public clamor for prosecutions-perhaps even show trials-
of corporate executives for their decisions that helped trigger the
financial crisis is difficult to ignore-something that former
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner called "Old
Testament justice." 8 0 The demurrer of the Department of Justice
due to the difficulty in proving intent for a criminal prosecution
naturally raises the question whether the law should be modified
to accommodate a lower standard to establish liability.
While it is certainly possible to draft legislation that
broadens the criminal law to reach more corporate executives, the
question remains whether it is a good idea. The financial crisis in
2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, and affected not
just the United States but the global financial system as a whole.
The interdependence of the world economy is not going to recede,
thus a means to protect the system from the types of harm that
can be inflicted by a few large banks, insurance companies, and
investment firms is a reason to consider new laws and regulations
to punish corporate misconduct.
A new means to reach individuals may avoid the problem of
only having companies accused of wrongdoing while executives
escape personal liability, Judge Jed S. Rakoff pointed to the move
toward corporate criminal prosecutions, settled through deferred
and non-prosecution agreements, as a reason why no senior
executives were charged for wrongdoing in connection with the
financial crisis, and argued for a return to individual
prosecutions.18 1 He asserted, "Although it is supposedly justified
because it prevents future crimes, I suggest that the future
deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far
outweighs the prophylactic benefits of imposing internal
IM Joshua Green, Inside Man, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2010, 9:00 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.comlmagazine/archive/2010/04/inside-man/307992; see also
Henning, supra note 15, at 107.
-n See Rakoff, supra note 8.
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compliance measures that are often little more than window-
dressing."1 82
But whether the criminal law is the best means to prevent
future misconduct by large institutions is less clear. In Dowling v.
United States,a3 the Supreme Court criticized the government's
use of a broad theft statute to pursue a narrow copyright
infringement, suggesting such an approach reflected "an indirect
but blunderbuss solution to a problem treated with precision when
considered directly."18 4 Adding a statute to make it easier to
prosecute executives when corporate decisions result in significant
losses may well be a "blunderbuss solution" when the root issue is
the size of financial institutions that creates the potential for one
company to wreak significant havoc, much less an entire sector
driving the economy to the brink of financial ruin. Does a new
crime change that calculus even a little bit?
It may be that the financial crisis was sui generis, in that the
combination of a residential real estate bubble fueled by lax
standards for issuing subprime mortgages, mixed with mortgage
securitization along with complex derivatives to spread risk
throughout the financial system is not something that will be
repeated. But then, corporate executives were called to account for
misconduct in earlier times, like the savings and loan crisis; yet no
one of any prominence in the banking and financial industry has
been accused of a crime related to the decisions that led to the
meltdown in the markets in 2008. Judge Rakoff noted the
pernicious effect of this approach: "So you don't go after the
companies, at least not criminally, because they are too big to jail;
and you don't go after the individuals, because that would involve
the kind of years-long investigations that you no longer have the
experience or the resources to pursue."1 85 Even if a criminal law
cannot prevent a future financial meltdown, it may add to the
public's confidence that significant corporate malfeasance can be
addressed at the individual level. Companies will happily pay
monetary penalties, perceived as little more than a cost of doing
business, effectively allowing executives to escape personal
182 Ird.
1- 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
'8 Id. at 226.
'8 See Rakoff, supra note 8.
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accountability. A new law targeting corporate management for
criminal prosecution may be a small step toward enhancing
personal accountability for business decisions that lead to
significant harm.
